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2Report Overview
This report presents results and discussion of the investment performance of those
bonds and bank loans that have defaulted on their scheduled payments to creditors and
continue trading while the issuing firm attempts a financial reorganization.  Monthly total
return measures are compiled based on the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Indexes of
Defaulted Bonds and Defaulted Banks Loans, as well as an index that combines bonds and
loans. These returns are compared to the total returns of common stocks and high yield
corporate bonds.  Returns are based on our market-weighted indexes and presented for the
past year (1999), as well as for the last 13 years (for bonds) and four years for bank loans.
We also estimate the expected supply of new defaulted debt in the United States for the
coming three years.
Nineteen ninety-nine was a mixed year for investors in distressed debt ecurities.
Although the Defaulted Public Bond Index increased by a respectable 11.34% in 1999, the
positive rate of increase was mainly a function of the excellent performance over a three-
month period in the earlier part of the year (February, March and April) when the size of
the index was comprised of a relatively small number of securities and when the movement
of a few issues had a significant influence on the Index.  Still, the positive annual
performance reversed the negative annual returns that we had observed in the prior two
years.  On a comparative note, our Defaulted Public Bond Index’s return of 11.34% was
slightly higher than Salomon Smith Barney’s Bankrupt Bond Index return of 8.42%.
Defaulted bank loans did not fare as well, recording a sl ght increase for the year of
0.65%.  Except for the initial year (1996) of our Bank Loan Index, performance has been
lackluster in the past three years.  Finally, the Combined Public Bond and Private Bank
Loan Index recorded a positive annual return in 1999 of 4.45%, resulting in a basically flat
performance over the four years of the combined index calculation period.  Comparative
returns for the thirteen-year period (1987-1999), show that common stocks strengthened its
number one asset class return/risk position.  High yield bonds, while performing relatively
poorly in 1999 (+1.7%), maintained a slight average annual return advantage over
defaulted bonds.
The two “bright” or positive factors related to the defaulted bond and bank loan
markets in 1999 were the enormous increase in the supply of new defaulted issues and the
record low average market value to face value ratio of the Index at the end of the year.  The
size of the Index more than doubled in number of issues and tripled in face and market
values over the past twelve months as the default amount of high yield bonds reached a
record high level in 1999 and the default rate went from 1.6% to over 4.0% (see our
companion report on Defaults and Returns in the High Yield Bond Market).  Based on our
forecast of future defaults, we expect the number and amounts of the issues in both the
Bond and Bank Loan indexes to continue to grow, albeit at a lower rate, in the next three
years.  Going forward, we suggest that this increased supply, and the relatively low market-
to-face value ratio of defaulted bonds at the end of 1999, may present significant investment
opportunities.
3Introduction
This report on the performance of defaulted bonds and bank loans presents our
annual update and analysis.  For in-depth discussions of the supply and demand elements
of defaulted and distressed securities, as well as their performance and other attributes,
see Altman (1993-1999), (1991), (1993); Branch and Ray (1992); Altman & Eberhart
(1994); Ward & Griepentrog (1993); Gilson (1995); Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998);
Reilly, Wright and Altman (1998); and Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999).  Despite
the lackluster performance of defaulted bonds and bank loans in the last several years, we
are confident that this “asset class” will continue to attract an increasing amount of new
capital and the supply of distressed and defaulted securities will continue to grow – a
phenomena that manifested itself strongly over the past 12 months.
Monitoring Performance
In order to monitor the performance of defaulted debt securities, a measure called
the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond Index (A-NYU Index) was developed
in 1990.1 The sample period of our Index starts in January 1987 and, as of December 31,
1999, contained 83 issues (60 companies) with a market value of $4.1 billion and a face
value of its component securities of $16.3 billion.  This is a dramatic increase from the
$1.4 and $5.5 billion amounts at the end of 1998.  The number of issues in the Index is
considerably larger than in the recent past and is more reminiscent of the size of the Index
in 1993 and 1994.  Indeed, the size of our Index, in terms of face value of public
defaulted bonds, is close to that of the early 1990s. Figure 1 shows the size of the index at
                                                 
1 This index, originally developed in Altman's Foothill Report (1990) is maintained and published on a
monthly basis at the NYU Salomon Center of the Leonard N. Stern School of Business.  It is available,
along with data and reports on high yield debt default rates and performance, from the Center (212/998-
0701 or 212/998-0709).
4year-end since its inception in December 1986.  Note the variability in the number of
issues from as low as 30 in 1986 to as high as 231 in 1992.  In our report last year, we
predicted that the size of the Index, as measured by market values and number of issues,
would increase in the coming years as defaults begin to rise – and it did in a most
spectacular way in 1999 (see our data at a later point in Figure 9).
One measure of the defaulted bond market's current relative health, and also its
potential, is the ratio of the aggregate market value to face value of the component
securities that comprise our indexes (last column of Exhibit 1).  This ratio has ranged, at
year-end, from a high of 0.74 in 1987 to its present low level of 0.25.  In most years, this
ratio varied between a fairly narrow range of about 0.40 to 0.52.  Excellent returns in
1987 (+38.0%) resulted in the market/face ratio of 0.74, while the precipitous declines in
1989, 1990 and 1998 dropped the ratio to below 0.30.  If you believe in the eventual
"regression to the mean" phenomenon, as we do, then 1999's year-end low of 0.25 bodes
well for future increases in the ratio and high investment returns.  The 1999 extremely
low ratio is especially interesting in that newly defaulted bonds' price levels generally
average about 40% of face value for all bonds and 50% for senior unsecured corporat s.
And, the majority of our 83 bond index issues are "senior" in priority.
In 1999, however, the average price of bonds just after default dropped to below 30 cents
on the dollar, and, despite the reasonably positive performance of our Public Bond Index
in 1999 (11.3%), the market/face value ratio remained at its all time low of 0.25.
The A-NYU Index includes securities of companies at various stages of the
reorganization process, either in bankruptcy or in a restructuring.  Data on returns is
compiled from just after default up to when the bankrupt firm either emerges from
5Chapter 11, is liquidated, or until the default is "cured" or resolved through an exchange.
Distressed restructuring company securities are also included.  The Index includes issues
of all seniorities, from senior-secured to junior-unsecured debt.  A study by Altman &
Eberhart (1994), updated by us for Standard & Poor's (Brand & Behar, 1998), assesses
the performance of defaulted debt from the time of original issuance through default and
then to emergence from bankruptcy.  These studies concluded that the seniority of the
issue is an extremely important determinant of the performance of defaulted debt for
specific periods, not only from issuance to emergence but also from default to
emergence.  (Note that the A-NYU Index does not include convertible or international
company issues).
An asset class related to defaulted debt securities i  the equities of firms emerging
from Chapter 11.  Eberhart, Altman and Aggarwal (1999) have studied the performance
of 131 of these emerging, "orphan" equities and concluded that the 200-day post-
emergence performance has been significantly better than the market performance of
common stocks in general, as compared to a sample of equities specifically matched to
the emerging stocks.  Since some number of distressed secu ities investors are investing
in, or at least continue to hold, these equities and since their expe ted performance is
linked to the values of debt securities while in reorganization, we will from time to time
comment on their performance.  A related study by Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998)
found that the active participation by “vulture” investors, (i.e., institutions who specialize
in distressed securities), is associated with superior post-Chapter 11 performance of the
emerging firm.
61999 Performance
As noted above, the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of defaulted bonds
performed fairly well in 1999, increasing by 11.34% and reversing the two prior years of
negative returns (Figure 2).  Returns were actually excellent through the first half of the
year (21%), but this was due to a relatively small number of issues (mainly wireless
communication Chapter 11’s) in an index that was still quite small in its size.  The market
performed poorly in the second half of the year (except in November), falling by over
8%, as the size of the index increased dramatically.  The monthly returns for this past
year, as well as for all of the prior 12 years, is shown in Appendix A. The Index rose
from 221.9 at the end of 1998 to 247.0 at the end of 1999 (December 1986=100).
During 1999, there were several exceptionally good and several very poor
months, as the index appeared to be quite volatile.  The months with positive returns
above 5% were March, April, and November while the corresponding poor months were
August, September, and October.  This compares with four months of ±5% returns in
1998 and none in 1997 (see our later discussion on highly volatile months in Figure 5).
In contrast, the S&P 500 Stock Index only had three monthly observations with returns or
losses exceeding 5% in 1999 and six in 1998 and 1997.
The overall performance of defaulted debt securities was again considerably
lower than the total return of the S&P 500 Common Stock Index (+20.98% - assuming
reinvestment of dividends) but considerably above the Salomon Smith Barney High
Yield Bond Market  Index (1.73%). On the other hand, “relatively safe” ten-year U.S.
Government securities performed poorly, losing 8.41% in 1999, as Treasury yields
increased by almost 200 bps in the last 12 months.
7Thirteen Year Comparative Performance
In Figure 2, we observe the return on defaulted bonds as well as common stocks
and high yield bonds for the entire thirteen-year sample period, 1987-1999.  Note that the
arithmetic average (9.37% per year) return for defaulted bonds is considerably less than
the S&P 500 (18.80%) and slightly below the Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Bond
Market Index for the same period.  In five of the 13 years, defaulted bonds performed
better than both of the other two indexes while in six years it performed the worst.  And,
the standard deviation of annual returns is largest for defaulted bonds.  On a monthly
basis, however, the volatility comparison (as measured by the standard deviation of
returns) is considerably different with defaulted bond issues actually showing slightly
lower volatility (4.16%) than common stocks (4.33%), but considerably higher than high
yield  bonds (1.76%).  This latter comparison is understandable since high yield bonds
pay a fairly steady fixed interest component each month while defaulted bonds do not.
We also calculate the S arpe ratio for each of our Risky Asset indexes.  This ratio
compares the excess performance (if any) of an asset class compared to default risk free
Treasury Bonds (in this case we use ten-year Treasuries) and then divides this excess
return by a measure of the volatility of the asset class – the standard deviation.  Again,
the defaulted bond index performance compares unfavorably to the other two asset
classes when we observe this measure of return/risk performance.  The poorer relative
Sharpe ratio measure is still evident when calculating monthly returns, but the differences
are not as great.
Figure 3 graphs the monthly index levels for our three security classes for the
entire sample period.  We can observe that in March 1995, the S&P index level once
8again rose above the two others and remains solidly in that position.  And, in mid-1997,
the High Yield Bond Index nudged the Defaulted Bond Index out of second place.
Diversification Attributes: Risky Asset Returns Correlations
One of the potential strategies suggested by our anal sis is to include defaulted
debt in a larger portfolio of risky securities.  A number of domestic pension funds and
foreign portfolios have, in effect, taken this approach by allocating a proportion of their
total investments to defaulted debt money managers.  Almost all portfolio managers
involved in the distressed market have been specialists in the sector, rather than investors
in distressed bonds within broader-based portfolios.  Therefore, the avenue of
diversification appears to be primarily through the use of different investment managers.
(There are some rare exceptions where a mutual fund combines investments in more
traditional debt and equity securities with distressed securities).  A number of "fund-of-
funds" that have adopted this strategy have also chosen distressed securities managers
with different styles including active, semi-active and passive approaches.  A similar
strategy, practiced by foreign closed-end funds, is to directly invest in a large number of
private U.S. distressed securities investment funds.  Instead of diversifying across asset
classes, these funds have a strategy of investing in distressed security managers with
different approaches.
Figure 4 demonstrates the correlation between the Altman-NYU Defaulted Bond
Index and the other two risky asset classes -- common stocks and high yield bonds -- for
the last 13 years.  We see that the monthly return correlation is only 0.26 between
defaulted debt and S&P equities.  This is down, somewhat, from 0.28 in the 1987-1998
period.  Since defaulted debt holders usually end up owning the equity of the emerged
9Chapter 11 entity, unless they sell the debt just prior to emergence from restructuring, it
is interesting to note the low correlation of returns between these two indexes.
Furthermore, the quarterly correlations are even lower (0.23).
The correlation between high yield bonds and defaulted bonds is fairly high at
about 0.56 (monthly) and 0.57 (quarterly).  Interestingly, the correlations between high
yield bonds and our Defaulted Loan Index (Figure 5) is significantly lower at 0.44
(monthly)  while the correlation of loans and equities is actually negative, indicating an
inverse relationship.  The quarterly correlation of loans and equities is essentially zero.
We believe that the relatively high correlation of defaulted securities and risky
bonds is partially a function of the operating performance of firms in general, the outlook
for risky companies, and the overall confidence in the market for risky debt.  Although
these latter correlations are relatively high, it is also clear that the Defaulted Debt Index is
more volatile -- in both good and bad years.  Again, this is not surprising since high yield
debt has a base return equal to the interest payments received in each period while
virtually all defaulted bonds and most defaulted loans trade "flat" (without interest
receipts).  In addition, there is a great deal of uncertainty about what the reorganization
plan will specify and how each class of creditors will be treated -- not to mention the
possibility that the end-result will be a liquidation.  Finally, there are several critical event
dates during a bankruptcy reorganization (i.e., bankruptcy filing, post-default financing,
filing of a reorganization plan and the actual plan confirmation/ liquidation) which can
result in large swings in the price of debt issues.
We do observe that the relative volatility between defaulted debt and equity
returns, when measured on a monthly basis, puts the former in a much more favorable
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light.  This implies a greater degree of autoc rrelation (strings of gains or losses) that can
exacerbate annual return levels and volatility but not monthly return variability.
Correlations in Exceptional Months
The correlations listed in Figure 4 are for the entire period 1987-1999.  Starting in
last year’s Annual Report, we thought it instructive to analyze the correlation between
defaulted bonds and equities, and the correlations between defaulted bonds and high yield
bonds, when the stock market performs exceptionally well or poorly.  We selected an
arbitrary criterion of ±5.0% monthly stock market return as a definition of an exceptional
month.  Over the 13-year sample period, there were 32 months when the stock market's
performance exceeded this ±5% criteria (Figure 6).  Note that there were six observations
each in 1987 and 1997, none during the period 1992-1995, seven in 1998 and three in
1999.  August 1998 stands out as the biggest one-month decline for our Defaulted Bond
Index.
The correlations calculated (not shown) from the data for the exceptional months
are all considerably higher than the correlations when they are measured over the entire
13-year period.  For example, our defaulted bond index had a 0.46 correlation with the
stock market compared to 0.26 for the entire period.  And the S&P 500 Stock Index
correlation with high yield bonds jumps from 0.53 to 0.61.  This implies a type of
contagion effect in these highly volatile months.  The more liquid, and larger stock
markets’ extreme performance in these months impacts the performance of "fixed"
income securities that are also perceived as risky and quite a bit less liquid.  Despite the
higher correlations during exceptional months, we also observe that in 14 of 32 months,
the stock market and defaulted bond market moved in opposite directions. In the case of
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negative exceptional stock market months, however (6 instances), in two instances the
defaulted bond market increased (November 1987 and August 1997) and in one instance
(November 1987) the high yield bond index increased.
Defaulted Bank Loan Performance
In terms of rigorous analysis, a long neglected segment of the distressed securities
market is the private debt of defaulting companies -- particularly bank debt.  This neglect
is  in contrast to the market's increasing size and interest amongst investors and market
makers who trade bank debt of distressed firms.  We have attempted to fill this void by
calculating an index of defaulted bank debt facilities.
Our Altman-NYU Salomon Center Index of Defaulted Bank Loans is also a
market weighted index comprised of U.S. companies.  The Index started with 17 facilities
as of December 1995 (Figure 7) and at the end of 1999 had 45 (up from just 15 one year
earlier).  As of the end of 1999, the index had a face value of $12.9 billion and $6.8
billion in market value -- a market to face value of 0.53, down from 0.63 one-year earlier
and 0.71 two years earlier.  This compares with a 1999 market to face ratio of only 0.25
for our public bond index.  The Bank Loan Index is comprised of only senior debt, much
of which is secured; the Bond index, discussed earlier, is a mix of senior and
subordinated debt.  The 0.53 ratio is at the lowest level in the five-year history of our
Index and noticeably lower than what is typical for defaulted bank loans (see Carty et al,
1998 and Miller & Keisman, 1999).
The performance of our Bank Loan Index was relatively poor in 1999, marginally
gaining 0.65%.  The index closed as of the end of 1999 at 109.9 (December 1995=100).
Bank loans did not enjoy the early-in-the-year increases that defaulted bonds did.  Indeed,
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in only seven of the 12 months in 1999, did our Defaulted Bond and Bank Loan Indexes
have the same sign (+ or -) in terms of monthly returns.  The monthly Defaulted Bank
Loan Index, from its inception to the present, is shown in Appendix B.
Figure 8 shows that the four-year (1996-1999) Defaulted Bank Loan average
return was 2.93% per year, considerably below the stock market's continued incredible
performance and also below that of high yield bonds.  Like defaulted bonds, the annual
standard deviation for defaulted securities was the highest, and the monthly standard
error was lower than the stock market's and above that of high yield bonds.
Combined Bond and Bank Loan Index
We have also created a Combined Defaulted Securities Index, which is calculated
based on the market values and total returns of public bonds and private bank loans (see
Appendix C).  The Combined Index return was 4.45% in 1999,  causing the cumulative
four-year index to again exceed 100.0 – but just barely.  With the three indexes, we now
offer benchmark performance criteria for a more broadly defined distressed securities
market.
New Supply of Distressed and Defaulted Securities
We can observe that there has been a considerable increase in the size of the
public and private distressed debt market in the past year.  From Figure 1, we see that the
market value of our bond index in 1999 is now only slightly below what it was in 1990-
1993 (except 1992).  The number of issues, while considerably above the level of just one
year ago (83 vs. 36), is still below the levels of the early 1990’s.  The large increase in
our Public Bond Index’s size came from the record amount of new defaults in 1999 of
over $23 billion on a default rate of 4.15% of the high yield bond market (see Figure 9).
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As for the future, we expect the market for distressed and defaulted securities to
continue to increase considerably.  The huge new issue supply of non-investment grade
debt in the last seven years of over $560 billion should result in an increase of default
amounts in the coming years.  Although we do not expect the near-term default rates to
approach the record years of 1990 and 1991, the net supply of distressed and defaulted
issues will almost certainly increase.  Indeed, based on our mortality rate estimation
technique (Altman, 1989) and considering the last 10 years of new issuance in the
corporate bond markets, we expect new public bond defaults of $60 billion and $24
billion (face values and market values) over the next three years (Figures 10 and 11).  We
also expect private defaulted debt (mainly bank loans) to add $144 billion (face value)
and $100 billion (market value) to the defaulted debt aggregate totals.
The current level of 45 bank facilities from 23 companies in our Index is
already larger than at any time in the past.  We also anticipate that the market to face
value ratio will rise from its current historically low level of 0.53.
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FIGURE 1
SIZE OF THE ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
DEFAULTED BOND INDEX
(1986 - 1999)
Year Number of Number of Face Value Market Value Market /
End Issues Firms ($ Billions) ($ Billions) Face Ratio
1986 30 10 1.7 0.5 0.29
1987 53 18 5.7 4.2 0.74
1988 91 34 5.2 2.7 0.52
1989 111 35 8.7 3.4 0.39
1990 173 68 18.7 5.1 0.27
1991 207 80 19.6 6.1 0.31
1992 231 90 21.7 11.1 0.51
1993 151 77 11.8 5.8 0.49
1994 93 35 6.3 3.3 0.52
1995 50 27 5.0 2.3 0.46
1996 39 28 5.3 2.4 0.45
1997 37 26 5.9 2.7 0.46
1998 36 30 5.5 1.4 0.25
1999 83 60 16.3 4.1 0.25
Year
Altman-NYU 
Salomon Center 
Defaulted Bond 
Index
S&P 500 
Stock Index
Salomon Smith 
Barney High Yield 
Market Index (1)
1987 37.85% 5.26% 4.67%
1988 26.49% 16.61% 13.47%
1989 -22.78% 31.68% 2.75%
1990 -17.08% -3.12% -7.04%
1991 43.11% 30.48% 39.93%
1992 15.39% 7.62% 17.86%
1993 27.91% 10.08% 17.36%
1994 6.66% 1.32% -1.25%
1995 11.26% 37.56% 19.71%
1996 10.21% 22.96% 11.29%
1997 -1.58% 34.36% 13.18%
1998 -26.91% 28.58% 3.60%
1999 11.34% 20.98% 1.74%
1987 - 1999 Arithmetic
Average (Annual) Rate 9.37% 18.80% 10.56%
Standard Deviation 22.00% 13.51% 12.02%
1987 - 1999 Compounded 7.20% 18.07% 9.99%
Average (Annual) Rate
Sharpe Ratio 0.10 0.86 0.28
1987 - 1999 Arithmetic
Average (Monthly) Rate 0.67% 1.49% 0.81%
Standard Deviation 4.16% 4.33% 1.76%
1987 - 1999 Compounded 0.58% 1.39% 0.80%
Average (Monthly) Rate
(1) High Yield Market Index was used for 1987 and 1988
(1987 - 1999)
ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
FIGURE 2
DEFAULTED BOND INDEX
COMPARISON OF RETURNS
FIGURE 3
DEFAULTED BOND, STOCK, AND HIGH YIELD BOND INDICES
1987-1999
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Altman-NYU Salomon Center Defaulted Bond IndexS&P 500 Index SSMB High Yield Index
Correlation of Monthly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Bond Index
S&P 500 Stock 
Index
Salomon Smith 
Barney High 
Yield Index (1)
Altman-NYU Bond Index 100.00% 25.62% 55.56%
S&P 500 Stock Index  100.00% 52.76%
Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Index   100.00%
Correlation of Quarterly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Bond Index
S&P 500 Stock 
Index
Salomon Smith 
Barney High 
Yield Index (1)
Altman-NYU Bond Index 100.00% 23.31% 56.52%
S&P 500 Stock Index 100.00% 47.97%
Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Index 100.00%
(1) High Yield Market Index was used for 1987 and 1988
FIGURE 4
CORRELATION OF ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEXES
OF DEFAULTED BONDS WITH OTHER SPECULATIVE
SECURITIES INDEXES 1987 - 1999
Correlation of Monthly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Loan Index
S&P 500 Stock 
Index
Salomon Smith 
Barney High 
Yield Index (1)
Altman-NYU 
Bond Index
Altman-NYU Loan Index 100.00% -0.26% 43.59% 62.10%
S&P 500 Stock Index  100.00% 61.26% 14.26%
Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Index   100.00% 55.79%
Altman-NYU Bond Index 100.00%
Correlation of Quarterly Returns
Altman-NYU 
Loan Index
S&P 500 Stock 
Index
Salomon Smith 
Barney High 
Yield Index (1)
Altman-NYU 
Bond Index
Altman-NYU Loan Index 100.00% 3.96% 29.31% 79.25%
S&P 500 Stock Index 100.00% 76.36% 30.06%
Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Index 100.00% 40.10%
Altman-NYU Bond Index 100.00%
(1) High Yield Market Index was used for 1987 and 1988
FIGURE 5
CORRELATION OF ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEXES
OF DEFAULTED LOANS WITH OTHER SPECULATIVE
SECURITIES INDEXES 1996 - 1999
Month
Bank Loan 
Index
Bond Index
S&P 500 
Stock Index
Salomon Smith Barney 
High Yield Index (1)
Jan-87 9.80% 13.47% 2.83%
Jun-87 2.90% 5.05% 1.38%
Jul-87 5.50% 5.07% 0.54%
Oct-87 -8.92% -21.54% -2.67%
Nov-87 3.22% -8.24% 2.53%
Dec-87 7.53% 7.61% 1.33%
Jan-89 -4.47% 7.32% 1.50%
Apr-89 2.06% 5.19% 0.30%
Jul-89 2.46% 9.03% 0.47%
Jan-90 -2.91% -6.71% -3.03%
May-90 -1.23% 9.75% 2.63%
Aug-90 -3.03% -9.04% -3.87%
Nov-90 -2.69% 6.46% 2.02%
Feb-91 8.49% 7.15% 8.82%
Dec-91 -3.53% 11.44% 1.34%
Sep-96 0.79% 2.11% 5.63% 2.34%
Jan-97 1.88% -1.54% 6.25% 0.75%
Apr-97 -6.63% -2.13% 5.97% 0.71%
May-97 -1.93% 0.11% 6.88% 2.02%
Jul-97 0.45% -0.23% 7.96% 2.29%
Aug-97 1.19% 2.27% -5.60% 0.25%
Sep-97 2.41% 1.64% 5.48% 1.75%
Feb-98 -0.84% 2.96% 7.21% 0.68%
Mar-98 1.68% 0.82% 5.12% 1.08%
Aug-98 -6.27% -18.25% -14.46% -6.70%
Sep-98 -6.16% -11.21% 6.41% 1.23%
Oct-98 -7.88% -9.48% 8.13% -1.38%
Nov-98 5.44% 7.32% 6.06% 5.02%
Dec-98 -0.85% -2.43% 5.76% -0.07%
Jun-99 2.58% 1.00% 5.50% -0.22%
Oct-99 -2.64% -7.13% 6.33% -0.68%
Dec-99 -0.12% -0.92% 5.89% 0.84%
(1) High Yield Market Index was used for 1987 and 1988
FIGURE 6
CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEXES
GIVEN A CHANGE IN S&P GREATER THAN 5%
Year Number of Number of Face Value Market Value Market/
End Issues Firms ($ Billions) ($ Billions) Face Ratio
1995 17 14 2.9 2.0 0.69
1996 23 22 4.2 3.3 0.79
1997 18 15 3.4 2.4 0.71
1998 15 13 3.0 1.9 0.63
1999 45 23 12.9 6.8 0.53
FIGURE 7
SIZE OF THE ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
DEFAULTED BANK LOAN INDEX
(1996 - 1999)
Year
Altman-NYU 
Salomon 
Center Bank 
Loan Index
S&P 500 
Stock 
Index
Salomon Smith 
Barney High 
Yield Market 
Index
1996 19.56% 22.96% 11.29%
1997 1.75% 34.36% 13.18%
1998 -10.22% 28.58% 3.60%
1999 0.65% 20.98% 1.74%
1996 - 1999 Arithmetic
Average (Annual) Rate 2.93% 26.72% 7.45%
Standard Deviation 12.33% 6.02% 5.63%
1996 - 1999. Compounded 2.39% 26.61% 7.34%
Average (Annual) Rate
1996 - 1999 Arithmetic
Average (Monthly) Rate 0.24% 2.08% 0.60%
Standard Deviation 2.96% 4.46% 1.59%
1996 - 1999 Compounded 0.20% 1.99% 0.59%
Average (Monthly) Rate
(1996 - 1999)
FIGURE 8
ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
BANK LOAN INDEX
COMPARISON OF RETURNS
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P SSMB-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
JAN-87 109.80 9.80% 13.47%
FEB-87 121.37 10.53% 3.95%
MAR-87 125.95 3.77% 2.89%
APR-87 127.52 1.25% -0.89%
MAY-87 128.09 0.44% 0.87%
JUN-87 131.80 2.90% 5.05%
JUL-87 139.05 5.50% 5.07%
AUG-87 139.77 0.52% 3.73%
SEP-87 136.35 -2.45% -2.19%
OCT-87 124.19 -8.92% -21.54%
NOV-87 128.19 3.22% -8.24%
DEC-87 137.85 7.53% 7.61%
TOTAL 1987 RETURN 37.85% 5.26%
JAN-88 139.84 1.44% 4.21%
FEB-88 147.45 5.44% 4.66%
MAR-88 152.01 3.10% -3.09%
APR-88 156.85 3.18% 1.11%
MAY-88 155.42 -0.91% 0.87%
JUN-88 166.94 7.41% 4.59%
JUL-88 165.05 -1.14% -0.38%
AUG-88 160.40 -2.82% -3.40%
SEP-88 160.28 -0.07% 4.26%
OCT-88 157.69 -1.61% 2.78%
NOV-88 166.88 5.83% -1.43%
DEC-88 174.36 4.48% 1.75%
TOTAL 1988 RETURN 26.49% 16.61%
APPENDIX B
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED BANK LOANS
  Returns (1996 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 Stock Index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
** Base of 100 starting December 1995 for Altman Index**
BANK BANK LOAN PUBLIC BOND S&P
LOAN PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN
Jan-96 100.96 0.96% 2.51% 3.40%
Feb-96 103.79 2.80% 7.75% 0.93%
Mar-96 106.69 2.79% 4.54% 0.96%
Apr-96 106.68 -0.01% 1.98% 1.47%
May-96 111.88 4.87% 1.28% 2.58%
Jun-96 116.08 3.76% 3.31% 0.38%
Jul-96 117.68 1.38% -1.09% -4.42%
Aug-96 116.34 -1.14% 0.24% 2.11%
Sep-96 117.26 0.79% 2.11% 5.63%
Oct-96 119.24 1.69% 1.90% 2.76%
Nov-96 119.69 0.37% -8.62% 7.56%
Dec-96 119.56 -0.10% -5.10% -1.98%
TOTAL 1996 RETURN 19.56% 10.21% 22.96%
Jan-97 121.81 1.88% -1.54% 6.25%
Feb-97 124.73 2.40% 1.44% 0.78%
Mar-97 125.69 0.77% 1.74% -4.11%
Apr-97 117.36 -6.63% -2.13% 5.97%
May-97 115.10 -1.93% 0.11% 6.88%
Jun-97 119.23 3.60% -0.57% 4.48%
Jul-97 119.77 0.45% -0.23% 7.96%
Aug-97 121.20 1.19% 2.27% -5.60%
Sep-97 124.12 2.41% 1.64% 5.48%
Oct-97 124.42 0.24% -0.44% -3.34%
Nov-97 123.90 -0.41% -1.15% 4.63%
Dec-97 121.65 -1.82% -2.58% 1.72%
TOTAL 1997 RETURN 1.75% -1.58% 34.36%
COMBINED ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER
DEFAULTED PUBLIC BOND AND BANK LOAN INDEXES
(December 1995 = 100)
Monthly Year-to-Date 
Date Level Return Return
Dec-95 100.0
Jan-96 101.8 1.80% 1.80%
Feb-96 107.1 5.21% 7.09%
Mar-96 111.1 3.71% 11.05%
Apr-96 112.2 1.04% 12.23%
May-96 115.7 3.13% 15.74%
Jun-96 119.8 3.53% 19.82%
Jul-96 119.8 0.02% 19.84%
Aug-96 119.0 -0.67% 19.04%
Sep-96 120.8 1.47% 20.79%
Oct-96 123.0 1.80% 22.97%
Nov-96 118.3 -3.80% 18.29%
Dec-96 115.6 -2.26% 15.62%
Jan-97 116.2 0.48% 0.48%
Feb-97 118.6 2.04% 2.54%
Mar-97 119.9 1.15% 3.71%
Apr-97 114.6 -4.39% -0.83%
May-97 113.7 -0.85% -1.68%
Jun-97 115.4 1.51% -0.19%
Jul-97 115.6 0.19% -0.08%
Aug-97 117.5 1.72% 1.64%
Sep-97 119.8 2.01% 3.67%
Oct-97 119.7 -0.13% 3.54%
Nov-97 118.7 -0.79% 2.72%
Dec-97 116.1 -2.22% 0.44%
Jan-98 115.9 -0.20% -0.20%
Feb-98 116.3 0.38% 0.18%
Mar-98 117.8 1.32% 1.50%
Apr-98 121.0 2.67% 4.21%
May-98 123.8 2.31% 6.61%
Jun-98 123.0 -0.66% 5.91%
Jul-98 123.6 0.51% 6.45%
Aug-98 109.2 -11.67% -5.97%
Sep-98 100.0 -8.37% -13.83%
Oct-98 91.5 -8.52% -21.18%
Nov-98 97.2 6.20% -16.29%
Dec-98 95.7 -1.51% -17.55%
Jan-99 97.6 1.97% 1.97%
Feb-99 98.4 0.78% 2.77%
Mar-99 99.2 0.84% 3.63%
Apr-99 105.5 6.31% 10.16%
May-99 105.9 0.45% 10.66%
Jun-99 107.7 1.66% 12.49%
Jul-99 110.4 2.49% 15.29%
Aug-99 105.0 -4.87% 9.67%
Sep-99 103.3 -1.58% 7.94%
Oct-99 98.8 -4.34% 3.26%
Nov-99 100.4 1.59% 4.90%
Dec-99 100.0 -0.43% 4.45%
 APPENDIX C
APPENDIX B
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED BANK LOANS
  Returns (1996 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 Stock Index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
** Base of 100 starting December 1995 for Altman Index**
BANK BANK LOAN PUBLIC BOND S&P
LOAN PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN
Jan-98 121.2 -0.38% 0.00% 1.11%
Feb-98 120.2 -0.84% 1.96% 7.21%
Mar-98 122.2 1.68% 0.82% 5.12%
Apr-98 127.3 4.19% 0.19% 1.01%
May-98 130.3 2.33% 2.27% -1.72%
Jun-98 129.0 -0.99% -0.28% 4.06%
Jul-98 128.9 -0.05% 1.15% -1.07%
Aug-98 120.8 -6.26% -18.25% -14.46%
Sep-98 113.4 -6.16% -11.21% 6.41%
Oct-98 104.5 -7.88% -9.48% 8.13%
Nov-98 110.2 5.44% 7.32% 6.06%
Dec-98 109.2 -0.85% -2.43% 5.76%
1998 YTD -10.22% -26.91% 28.58%
Jan-99 113.1 3.59% 0.22% 4.18%
Feb-99 112.0 -1.01% 3.91% -3.11%
Mar-99 110.1 -1.70% 5.07% 4.00%
Apr-99 113.3 2.91% 11.15% 3.87%
May-99 115.5 1.92% -1.14% -2.36%
Jun-99 118.5 2.58% 1.00% 5.50%
Jul-99 120.0 1.31% 3.75% -3.12%
Aug-99 114.2 -4.80% -4.96% -0.50%
Sep-99 115.7 1.29% -5.33% -2.74%
Oct-99 112.7 -2.64% -7.13% 6.33%
Nov-99 110.1 -2.31% 6.75% 2.04%
Dec-99 109.9 -0.12% -0.92% 5.89%
1999 YTD 0.65% 11.34% 20.98%
SSMB-HYMI
PERCENT
RETURN
1.47%
0.62%
-0.50%
-0.03%
0.56%
0.77%
0.65%
1.04%
2.34%
1.15%
1.92%
0.79%
11.29%
0.75%
1.70%
-1.03%
0.71%
2.02%
1.69%
2.29%
0.25%
1.75%
0.80%
0.51%
1.05%
13.18%
SSMB-HYMI
PERCENT
RETURN
2.26%
0.68%
1.08%
0.54%
0.27%
0.22%
0.80%
-6.70%
1.23%
-1.38%
5.02%
-0.07%
3.60%
1.50%
-0.84%
0.85%
2.09%
-1.57%
-0.22%
0.22%
-1.19%
-0.76%
-0.68%
1.57%
0.84%
1.74%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P SSMB-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
JAN-89 166.57 -4.47% 7.32% 1.75%
FEB-89 159.93 -3.99% -2.49% 0.43%
MAR-89 159.60 -0.21% 2.33% 0.01%
APR-89 162.88 2.06% 5.19% 0.69%
MAY-89 164.53 1.01% 4.05% 1.70%
JUN-89 164.38 -0.09% -0.57% 1.45%
JUL-89 168.43 2.46% 9.03% 0.45%
AUG-89 164.96 -2.06% 1.96% -0.39%
SEP-89 152.03 -7.84% -0.41% -1.62%
OCT-89 139.26 -8.40% -2.32% -2.26%
NOV-89 135.58 -2.64% 2.04% 0.37%
DEC-89 134.64 -0.70% 2.40% 0.22%
TOTAL 1989 RETURN -22.78% 31.68% 2.75%
JAN-90 130.72 -2.91% -6.71% -3.03%
FEB-90 127.03 -2.83% 1.29% -1.10%
MAR-90 132.08 3.98% 2.65% 1.06%
APR-90 134.03 1.48% -2.50% -0.51%
MAY-90 132.37 -1.23% 9.75% 2.63%
JUN-90 130.12 -1.71% -0.68% 1.86%
JUL-90 133.09 2.29% -0.32% 1.73%
AUG-90 129.06 -3.03% -9.04% -3.87%
SEP-90 125.21 -2.99% -4.87% -5.13%
OCT-90 119.85 -4.28% -0.43% -3.54%
NOV-90 116.63 -2.69% 6.46% 2.02%
DEC-90 111.64 -4.27% 2.79% 1.01%
TOTAL 1990 RETURN -17.08% -3.12% -7.04%
JAN-91 115.20 3.18% 4.36% 2.59%
FEB-91 124.97 8.49% 7.15% 8.82%
MAR-91 135.60 8.50% 2.42% 5.24%
APR-91 154.06 13.62% 0.24% 3.75%
MAY-91 158.67 2.99% 4.32% 0.71%
JUN-91 161.31 1.66% -4.58% 2.10%
JUL-91 169.99 5.39% 4.66% 2.85%
AUG-91 167.79 -1.30% 2.37% 2.33%
SEP-91 165.36 -1.45% -1.67% 0.67%
OCT-91 167.15 1.08% 1.34% 3.00%
NOV-91 165.61 -0.92% -4.03% 0.95%
DEC-91 159.77 -3.53% 11.44% 1.34%
TOTAL 1991 RETURN 43.11% 30.48% 39.93%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P SSMB-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
JAN-92 171.04 7.06% -1.86% 2.89%
FEB-92 176.52 3.21% 1.30% 2.93%
MAR-92 183.40 3.90% -1.95% 1.48%
APR-92 182.90 -0.27% 2.94% 0.74%
MAY-92 187.59 2.57% 0.49% 1.87%
JUN-92 185.62 -1.05% -1.49% 1.24%
JUL-92 186.09 0.25% 4.09% 1.85%
AUG-92 184.76 -0.72% -2.05% 1.33%
SEP-92 183.03 -0.93% 1.18% 0.93%
OCT-92 181.53 -0.82% 0.35% -1.22%
NOV-92 180.79 -0.41% 3.41% 1.38%
DEC-92 184.36 1.97% 1.23% 1.19%
TOTAL 1992 RETURN 15.39% 7.62% 17.86%
JAN-93 194.59 5.55% 0.84% 2.44%
FEB-93 200.59 3.09% 1.36% 1.89%
MAR-93 208.93 4.16% 2.11% 1.55%
APR-93 209.49 0.27% -2.42% 0.77%
MAY-93 214.81 2.54% 2.68% 1.38%
JUN-93 218.68 1.80% 0.29% 2.23%
JUL-93 224.26 2.55% -0.40% 0.98%
AUG-93 226.79 1.13% 3.79% 1.08%
SEP-93 229.73 1.30% -0.77% 0.24%
OCT-93 231.21 0.64% 2.07% 1.94%
NOV-93 235.27 1.76% -0.95% 0.54%
DEC-93 235.82 0.23% 1.21% 1.10%
TOTAL 1993 RETURN 27.91% 10.08% 17.36%
JAN-94 239.18 1.43% 3.40% 2.17%
FEB-94 246.84 3.20% -2.71% -0.46%
MAR-94 248.71 0.76% -4.36% -3.72%
APR-94 243.63 -2.04% 1.28% -0.91%
MAY-94 246.53 1.19% 1.64% 0.35%
JUN-94 243.90 -1.06% -2.45% 0.11%
JUL-94 245.06 0.47% 3.28% 0.98%
Aug-94 246.86 0.74% 4.10% 0.56%
Sep-94 250.31 1.40% -2.45% -0.26%
Oct-94 251.04 0.29% 2.25% 0.02%
Nov-94 252.28 0.50% -3.64% -1.10%
Dec-94 251.51 -0.30% 1.48% 1.12%
TOTAL 1994 RETURN 6.66% 1.32% -1.25%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P SSMB-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
JAN-95 250.97 -0.22% 2.59% 1.44%
FEB-95 256.42 2.17% 3.90% 3.33%
MAR-95 267.27 4.23% 2.95% 1.04%
APR-95 267.51 0.09% 2.95% 2.35%
May-95 282.02 5.42% 4.00% 2.98%
June-95 281.51 -0.18% 2.32% 0.71%
July-95 282.02 0.18% 3.31% 1.20%
Aug-95 282.10 0.03% 0.25% 0.62%
Sept-95 286.47 1.55% 4.22% 1.16%
Oct-95 273.01 -4.70% -0.36% 0.84%
Nov-95 278.39 1.97% 4.39% 0.91%
Dec-95 279.84 0.52% 1.93% 1.59%
TOTAL 1995 RETURN 11.26% 37.56% 19.71%
Jan-96 286.86 2.51% 0.96% 3.40% 1.47%
Feb-96 309.09 7.75% 2.80% 0.93% 0.62%
Mar-96 323.11 4.54% 2.79% 0.96% -0.50%
Apr-96 329.51 1.98% -0.01% 1.47% -0.03%
May-96 333.71 1.28% 4.87% 2.58% 0.56%
Jun-96 344.77 3.31% 3.76% 0.38% 0.77%
Jul-96 340.99 -1.09% 1.38% -4.42% 0.65%
Aug-96 341.81 0.24% -1.14% 2.11% 1.04%
Sep-96 349.01 2.11% 0.79% 5.63% 2.34%
Oct-96 355.63 1.90% 1.69% 2.76% 1.15%
Nov-96 324.98 -8.62% 0.37% 7.56% 1.92%
Dec-96 308.40 -5.10% -0.10% -1.98% 0.79%
TOTAL 1996 RETURN 10.21% 19.56% 22.96% 11.29%
Jan-97 303.64 -1.54% 1.88% 6.25% 0.75%
Feb-97 308.02 1.44% 2.40% 0.78% 1.70%
Mar-97 313.37 1.74% 0.77% -4.11% -1.03%
Apr-97 306.69 -2.13% -6.63% 5.97% 0.71%
May-97 307.03 0.11% -1.93% 6.88% 2.02%
Jun-97 305.28 -0.57% 3.60% 4.48% 1.69%
Jul-97 304.59 -0.23% 0.45% 7.96% 2.29%
Aug-97 311.49 2.27% 1.19% -5.60% 0.25%
Sep-97 316.60 1.64% 2.41% 5.48% 1.75%
Oct-97 315.20 -0.44% 0.24% -3.34% 0.80%
Nov-97 311.57 -1.15% -0.41% 4.63% 0.51%
Dec-97 303.53 -2.58% -1.82% 1.72% 1.05%
TOTAL 1997 RETURN -1.58% 1.75% 34.36% 13.18%
APPENDIX A
 ALTMAN-NYU SALOMON CENTER INDEX
  OF DEFAULTED PUBLIC BONDS AND BANK LOANS
Returns (1987 - 1999) and Comparison with
S&P 500 stock index and Salomon Smith Barney High Yield Market Index
(December 1986 = 100)
PUBLIC PUBLIC BOND BANK LOAN S&P SSMB-HYMI
BOND PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT PERCENT
MONTH INDEX RETURN RETURN RETURN RETURN
Jan-98 303.5 0.00% -0.38% 1.11% 2.26%
Feb-98 309.5 1.96% -0.84% 7.21% 0.68%
Mar-98 312.0 0.82% 1.68% 5.12% 1.08%
Apr-98 312.6 0.19% 4.19% 1.01% 0.54%
May-98 319.7 2.27% 2.33% -1.72% 0.27%
Jun-98 318.8 -0.28% -0.99% 4.06% 0.22%
Jul-98 322.5 1.15% -0.05% -1.07% 0.80%
Aug-98 263.6 -18.25% -6.26% -14.46% -6.70%
Sep-98 234.1 -11.21% -6.16% 6.41% 1.23%
Oct-98 211.9 -9.48% -7.88% 8.13% -1.38%
Nov-98 227.4 7.32% 5.44% 6.06% 5.02%
Dec-98 221.9 -2.43% -0.85% 5.76% -0.07%
1998 YTD -26.91% -10.22% 28.58% 3.60%
Jan-99 222.3 0.22% 3.59% 4.18% 1.50%
Feb-99 231.0 3.91% -1.01% -3.11% -0.84%
Mar-99 242.8 5.07% -1.70% 4.00% 0.85%
Apr-99 269.8 11.15% 2.91% 3.87% 2.09%
May-99 266.7 -1.14% 1.92% -2.36% -1.57%
Jun-99 269.4 1.00% 2.58% 5.50% -0.22%
Jul-99 279.5 3.75% 1.31% -3.12% 0.22%
Aug-99 265.6 -4.96% -4.80% -0.50% -1.19%
Sep-99 251.5 -5.33% 1.29% -2.74% -0.76%
Oct-99 233.5 -7.13% -2.64% 6.33% -0.68%
Nov-99 249.3 6.75% -2.31% 2.04% 1.57%
Dec-99 247.0 -0.92% -0.12% 5.89% 0.84%
1999 YTD 11.34% 0.65% 20.98% 1.74%
